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NUDGING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM TOWARD 
BETTER DECISIONS 
EDIE GREENE* & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN** 
DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 
(NYU PRESS 2012).  283 PP. 
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCESS (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2012).  416 PP. 
One of us has tacked a cartoon to the office door that shows three 
elderly gentlemen holding cocktails, obviously ill at ease in each other’s 
company—one looking down, a second glancing up, and a third whose gaze 
seems adrift.  The caption reads, “A psychologist, a lawyer, and a shoe 
salesman attempting to mingle at a cocktail party.”  This is obvious 
hyperbole because, as everyone knows, shoe salesmen can talk to all sorts 
of people,1 and as we will show, psychologists and lawyers have much to 
discuss.2  Two recent books, Jury Decision Making: The State of the 
 
* Edie Greene is Professor and Chair of Psychology and Director of the Graduate 
Concentration in Psychology and Law at the University of Colorado in Colorado Springs.  
She is lead author of Psychology and the Legal System (2014) and Determining Damages: 
The Psychology of Jury Awards (2003) and has published approximately seventy-five 
articles related to jury decisionmaking in scholarly journals, law reviews, or edited books.  
** Brian H. Bornstein is Professor of Psychology and Courtesy Professor of Law at the 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln.  He has published over 130 articles on jury decisionmaking 
and related topics, and he has authored or edited eight books.  His latest book is Stress, 
Trauma, and Wellbeing in the Legal System (with Monica K. Miller, 2013). 
1 See, e.g., Annie Favreau, Chatterbox Careers: 7 Jobs for Talkative People, 
BRAZENCAREERIST.COM (Aug. 16, 2011), http://blog.brazencareerist.com/2011/08/16/
chatterbox-careers-7-jobs-for-talkative-people/. 
2 See, e.g., Randall W. Engle, Comment from the Editor, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011) (emphasizing the importance of psychological scientists in legal 
scholarship); see also EDIE GREENE & KIRK HEILBRUN, WRIGHTSMAN’S PSYCHOLOGY AND 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2013); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: 
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Science3 by Dennis J. Devine and In Doubt: The Psychology of the 
Criminal Justice Process4 by Dan Simon, powerfully illustrate this 
symbiosis.  Although the books are bidirectional in the sense that they 
present psychology’s role in legal processes as well as legal implications for 
the field of psychology,5 their emphases are decidedly on how 
psychological research can be used to improve legal policy, procedure, and 
practice. 
To explore how legal processes and procedures can be improved 
through the use of research findings, we borrow the concept of “nudging,” 
popularized in the book entitled Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness.6  Authors Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein 
show that by considering the complex and occasionally irrational ways that 
people think, one can offer choices that make it easier for people to reach 
optimal decisions.  We extend this thinking into the legal realm and show 
that Devine’s and Simon’s books both offer scientifically based, pragmatic 
alternatives to procedures and practices that currently hamper fair and 
efficient legal decisionmaking.  We suggest that both Jury Decision Making 
and In Doubt show how legal decisions can be enhanced through science. 
I. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LAW 
In Jury Decision Making, Devine, an associate professor of 
psychology at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis, provides 
the most thorough and comprehensive collection to date of the large body 
of psychological scholarship on the variables that influence jury decisions.  
Specifically, he cites the many methodological and theoretical contributions 
of psychologists to understanding jury decisionmaking.  These include: (1) 
 
CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations 
of Behavioral Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675, 1675 (2011) (“Never has law 
relied as heavily on psychology as it does today.”). 
3 DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE (2012).  One of 
us (Bornstein) is currently coeditor of the New York University Press book series on 
psychology, crime, and law, which published Jury Decision Making.  However, he became 
an editor after the book was already in production, and he had no role in the book’s 
selection, editing, or publication. 
4 DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012). 
5 This type of reciprocal relationship is described in Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, 
Jury Decision Making: Implications for and from Psychology, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 63 (2011).  In the context of jury decisionmaking, the relationship is 
reciprocal because jury trials provide a setting for testing psychological theory regarding 
reasoning, judgment, decisionmaking, persuasion, stereotyping, and group behavior; and 
psychological research findings have informed and influenced trial practices. 
6 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5–7 (2008). 
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trial practices related to jury size, decision rule, jury selection, and judicial 
instructions; (2) the effects of trial context, including exposure to pretrial 
publicity and inadmissible evidence and varying verdict options and 
standards of proof; (3) characteristics of trial participants, such as 
defendants’ attractiveness, remorse, and prior records, and jurors’ 
dogmatism, beliefs about the legal system, and approaches to evaluating 
evidence presented at trial; and finally, (4) aspects of the evidence, 
including its strength and issues specific to evidence from eyewitnesses, 
experts, and scientists.  Devine relies on data from simulated and real juries 
alike on questions pertinent to both criminal and civil issues and includes 
studies of both individual jurors and interacting groups. 
Devine claims that because there have been relatively few attempts to 
tie together this large body of empirical research,7 his primary goal was to 
“gather the many findings about juries and synthesize them into an 
overarching theoretical framework.”8  Hence, the book’s most original 
contribution is his integrative, multi-level theory of jury decisionmaking 
that is fleshed out in the second half of the book.  As its title suggests, the 
theory proceeds on two levels of decisionmaking: by individual jurors and 
within the jury as a whole. 
Devine analogizes an individual juror’s decisionmaking to that of a 
film director who begins the process of shooting a film (reaching a 
decision) with a script in mind, forming images (in the juror’s case, mental 
images) of the components of the story, and eventually arriving at a final 
cut (an individual, preliminary verdict preference).  In the process, footage 
(evidence) that does not adhere well to the narrative being developed will 
be discarded, left on the cutting-room floor.  Any ambivalence about the 
 
7 A few algebraic and stochastic models of individual jurors’ decisions were developed 
in the early years of scholarship on jury decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Thomas M. Ostrom et al., 
An Integration Theory Analysis of Jurors’ Presumptions of Guilt or Innocence, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, 436 (1978); Ewart A. C. Thomas & Anthony Hogue, 
Apparent Weight of Evidence, Decision Criteria, and Confidence Ratings in Juror Decision 
Making, 83 PSYCHOL. REV. 442, 443–44 (1976).  To date, the most influential theory 
describing how individual jurors reach decisions is the story model, which focuses on the 
manner in which jurors form narrative accounts of the evidence.  See Nancy Pennington & 
Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 242, 243–45 (1986) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation]; 
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for 
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 189–93 (1992) 
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Tests of the Story Model].  Various jury-level models 
focus on the distribution of verdict preferences in a group.  See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr, Social 
Transition Schemes: Charting the Group’s Road to Agreement, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 684, 689 (1981). 
8 DEVINE, supra note 3, at 2. 
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cohesiveness of the narrative will trigger the construction of alternate 
endings—as disgruntled moviegoers can readily attest—or, in the jurors’ 
case, of alternative narratives. 
Readers familiar with the influential story model developed by Nancy 
Pennington and Reid Hastie in the 1980s and 1990s9 might well ask how 
Devine’s model differs from that.  Although the story model invokes 
notions of jurors’ expectations regarding how stories are constructed, 
Devine has more to say about the importance of jurors’ cognitive structures, 
termed schemas, including event-related constructions termed scripts and 
person-related constructions termed stereotypes.  Devine articulates several 
other subcomponents of this part of his model, including the role of 
defendant characteristics, individual differences among jurors, and the 
persuasiveness of the prosecution’s or plaintiff’s evidence based on its 
scope, credibility, and singularity. 
When deliberations begin, the process of decisionmaking shifts to 
“story sampling,” in which jurors share their personally constructed stories, 
and the group as a whole samples from these offerings.  The likelihood that 
any individual juror’s story will emerge as the preferred, shared verdict 
depends on that juror’s status within the group and on the nature of his or 
her contributions (i.e., wholly constructed stories are more persuasive than 
scattered thoughts, observations, or questions).  The nature of verdict-
favoring factions, including their size, the effectiveness of their leaders, and 
the cohesiveness of faction members, also matter.  The jury-related aspects 
of this model are, in our opinion, the particularly important contributions of 
Devine’s theorizing, because jury behavior has been studied much less 
intensively than individual jurors’ cognitive processes.  Devine’s model 
impressively combines previously distinct concepts, such as minority and 
majority influence, normative and informational social influence, social 
sharing of information, and deliberation style.  In addition, it suggests a 
number of novel and testable predictions that should keep Devine and other 
jury scholars busy for years to come. 
In In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process, Simon, a 
professor of psychology and law at the University of Southern California, 
reviews psychological research to explain why the predictable irrationality 
of human thought processes diminishes the accuracy of evidence gathering 
and verdict determinations.  He also suggests ways to rectify this situation.  
Simon’s approach is simultaneously narrower and broader than Devine’s: 
narrower in that it focuses solely on the criminal justice system and 
 
9 Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 7, at 243–45; Pennington & 
Hastie, Tests of the Story Model, supra note 7, at 189–93. 
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excludes civil law, yet broader in that it covers the psychological processes 
involved not only in jury decisionmaking but in a number of other 
important contexts, such as police investigations, interrogations, and 
eyewitness testimony.  Because a relatively small number of criminal (as 
well as civil) disputes ultimately wind up before a jury, this scope makes 
the subject matter of In Doubt relevant to a large number of legal actors, 
including the police who investigate crimes, the witnesses, suspects, and 
defendants who provide evidence, and the judges and jurors who serve as 
fact finders at trial.  As Simon observes at the book’s outset, “[o]ne of the 
obvious features of the criminal justice process is that it is operationalized 
mostly through people: witnesses, detectives, suspects, lawyers, judges, and 
jurors. . . .  Criminal verdicts can be no better than the combined result of 
the mental operations of the people involved in the process.”10  We consider 
concerns about the mental operations of these legal players throughout this 
Review. 
Simon’s book goes on to examine many of the ways in which those 
mental operations can, and often do, diminish the accuracy of the process in 
terms of how the evidence is obtained and used and how that evidence 
influences verdicts.  Simon describes that investigators, in their zeal to 
resolve cases, can make premature judgments that confirm their suspicions 
about suspects’ involvement, assess suspects’ truthfulness incorrectly, and 
conduct interrogations that coerce suspects into confessing falsely.  The 
mistakes can continue when investigators interview eyewitnesses about 
their memories for details of crimes and identification of the perpetrators as 
well as during trials when those same eyewitnesses can exert inordinate 
influence on jurors’ judgments.  The chapter on fact-finding at trial, in 
which this book overlaps most with Jury Decision Making, makes the 
important point that jurors overweigh factors that have little to no predictive 
value (e.g., eyewitness confidence) while being relatively insensitive to 
factors that do predict witness accuracy (e.g., witnessing conditions).11 
In In Doubt, Simon does an admirable job of summarizing a large 
volume of literature in a relatively short space.  He also provides some 
prescriptions for remedying errors.  Underscoring the emphasis on 
practicality, each chapter concludes with a useful set of recommended 
reforms, about which we will have more to say.  As the author 
acknowledges, some of these reforms would require systematic changes 
(e.g., shifting investigative incentives from clearing crimes to seeking the 
 
10 SIMON, supra note 4, at 2. 
11 See, e.g., Melissa Boyce et al., Belief of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, in 2 THE 
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 501, 510–11 (R. C. L. 
Lindsay et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE HANDBOOK]. 
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truth), whereas others are legally complex (e.g., allowing more expert 
testimony on topics like false confessions and eyewitness memory).  But 
still others are quite feasible and straightforward, such as recording witness 
interviews and suspect interrogations and thereby increasing transparency 
throughout the process.  Simon argues persuasively that the reforms would 
improve the accuracy of the criminal justice process and thereby reduce the 
incidence of false convictions, cases that he uses effectively to illustrate 
some of the problems with the system in its present form. 
That Simon’s book is short on methodological and statistical details 
will make it less useful to researchers in the field than Devine’s book, 
which contains more of the methodological nitty-gritty.  Conversely, it 
should be more appealing to a lay audience, including practitioners (e.g., 
attorneys, judges, police) and policymakers.  Taken together, these two 
books make it abundantly clear that psychological theorizing and 
experimentation have much to offer the law. 
But is the legal system listening?  The data on this point are mixed.  
Eyewitness researchers in particular have had some notable successes 
lately, as demonstrated by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in 
State v. Henderson, in which the court recognized and accepted the results 
of empirical research studies, and revised its standards for assessing 
eyewitness evidence and instructing jurors in cases involving eyewitness 
memory.12   It also supported the increasing admissibility of expert 
testimony on eyewitness memory.13  However, courts have been slower to 
adopt changes based on research on other topics, such as jurors’ difficulty 
understanding and applying jury instructions.14 
II. ADDING BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS TO THE MIX 
Let’s return to that cartoon.  Imagine that an economist has taken the 
place of the shoe salesman.  Would that trio—the lawyer, the psychologist, 
and the economist—be likely to converse?  Based on the growing body of 
empirical research that relies on experimental methodologies and theories 
of psychology to understand individual and group choices and judgments of 
relevance to the law—the field of behavioral law and economics—we 
suspect that the answer would be a resounding “yes.” 
 
12 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 912–14 (2011). 
13 Id.; see also Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Has Eyewitness Research Penetrated the 
American Legal System? A Synthesis of Case History, Juror Knowledge, and Expert 
Testimony, in THE HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 453, 456–58. 
14 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 4, at 184–91; Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious 
Little Guidance: Jury Instructions on Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 743, 
745–47 (2000) (describing ambiguity of jury instructions on damage awards). 
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Over the past forty years, psychologists have observed that humans 
deviate in predictable ways from rational choice theory—the approach, long 
dominant in economics and increasingly prominent in sociology, political 
science, and criminology, that assumes individuals’ choices are internally 
coherent and logically consistent with their biases and preferences.15  At its 
most basic level, rational choice theory assumes that all decisions and 
actions are fundamentally rational in nature.16  Yet through empirical 
research in many domains, including police stations,17 lawyers’ offices,18 
and courtrooms,19 psychologists have learned that people rely on heuristics 
and biases that are often useful in simplifying decisions but that lead to 
judgmental errors and deviations from rationality.20  A straightforward 
example in the law is this: because jurors make decisions about a 
defendant’s liability in hindsight (i.e., after learning that a plaintiff has been 
injured, allegedly due to some (in)action on the part of the defendant), their 
verdict is likely to be influenced by their knowledge of the consequences of 
the defendant’s actions.21  In Jury Decision Making, Devine neatly 
summarizes other instances in which trial-related procedures or individual-
difference variables influence outcomes, often in predictably irrational 
ways, and he provides effect sizes—the strength of the relationships among 
 
15 See Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 364, 364 (1995). 
16 See id. 
17 See, e.g., Lori H. Colwell et al., US Police Officers’ Knowledge Regarding Behaviors 
Indicative of Deception: Implications for Eradicating Erroneous Beliefs Through Training, 
12 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 489, 491–92 (2006). 
18 Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Forecasting Trial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher 
Probability to Possibilities That Are Described in Greater Detail, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
159, 162–67 (2002); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability 
to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 137 (2010). 
19 Andrew J. Evelo & Edie Greene, Judgments About Felony-Murder in Hindsight, 27 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 277, 279 (2013); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post 
≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 93 (1995); C. 
Neil Macrae, A Tale of Two Curries: Counterfactual Thinking and Accident-Related 
Judgments, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84, 85 (1992).  But see Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
72, 75–76 (2011). 
20 Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 1686 (noting that “in many important instances, people 
pull the wrong cognitive tools out of their adaptive toolboxes”). 
21 Marylie Karlovac & John M. Darley, Attribution of Responsibility for Accidents: A 
Negligence Law Analogy, 6 SOC. COGNITION 287, 289–91 (1988); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Lee 
Roy Beach, Human Inference and Judgment: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 34 
STAN. L. REV. 939, 949 (1982) (“If the jurors use their newly acquired knowledge to judge 
what the defendant . . . should have known at the time of the accident, they may be more 
likely to find the [defendant] negligent—a verdict that may be substantially different from 
one arrived at in the absence of this knowledge.”). 
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variables—and an assessment of the extent of support in the scholarly 
literature.  Both of these concepts are useful to academic researchers. 
Deviations from rational choice theory raise practical concerns about 
how well laypeople and even some experts can assess choices and make 
judgments.  As Simon explains throughout In Doubt, cognitive errors 
related to legal decisions mean, among other things, that detectives rely on 
confirmation biases in criminal investigations,22 criminal jurors are overly 
reliant on eyewitnesses’ stated confidence in their identifications,23 civil 
jurors anchor their monetary judgments on the damage awards suggested by 
counsel,24 trial attorneys undervalue the opinions of other lawyers in 
predicting potential jury verdicts,25 and judges have difficulty disregarding 
inadmissible evidence.26 
Importantly, though, these deviations into apparent irrationality are, to 
a large extent, predictable, so procedural rules can be designed to reduce 
their impacts and prevent them from affecting the outcomes of adjudication.  
But this begs two questions: Which legal decisions are likely to be affected 
by cognitive biases, and how dramatically can and should the relevant 
procedures be changed to address this predictable irrationality? 
Simon tackles these questions in the context of criminal investigations.  
He first articulates the mechanisms that can bias criminal investigators’ 
judgments and then artfully considers ways to revise investigative 
procedures to counter these biases.  In so doing, Simon raises the 
possibilities that a) investigators could be forced to consider alternative 
 
22 Karl Ask & Pär Anders Granhag, Motivational Bias in Criminal Investigators’ 
Judgments of Witness Reliability, 37 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 583–84 (2007); Karl 
Ask et al., The ‘Elasticity’ of Criminal Evidence: A Moderator of Investigator Bias, 22 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1245, 1258 (2008). 
23 Neil Brewer & Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Eyewitness 
Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361 (2002); Elizabeth 
R. Tenney et al., Calibration Trumps Confidence as a Basis for Witness Credibility, 18 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 46, 49 (2007). 
24 EDIE GREENE & BRIAN  H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JURY AWARDS 150–56 (2003); Bradley D. McAuliff & Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are 
Not Created Equal: The Effects of Per Diem Versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and 
Suffering Awards, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 164, 171 (2010).  See also Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on 
Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361–62 (1999). 
25 Jonas Jacobson et al., Predicting Civil Jury Verdicts: How Attorneys Use (and Misuse) 
a Second Opinion, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 99, 113 (2011). 
26 Such evidence includes demands disclosed in settlement negotiations, conversations 
protected by attorney–client privilege, and rape victims’ prior sexual histories.  Andrew J. 
Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately 
Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1283, 1330–31 (2005). 
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hypotheses and explain why they should be rejected,27 and b) some team 
members could offer countertheories to the prevailing hypothesis and spur 
debate about the strengths and weaknesses of these different options.28  He 
also proposes a far more feasible procedure for enhancing the objectivity of 
criminal investigations: electronic recordings.  Simon suggests that all 
interactions between investigators and witnesses should be recorded and 
preserved in their entirety, careful records should be made of all other 
investigative procedures, including those that lead to deadends, and the 
complete record of these activities should be made available to all parties 
involved in cases.  According to Simon, the result of creating a complete 
record of an investigation is a reduction in its adversarial intensity as well 
as enhanced accuracy and transparency.  With an awareness that their 
decisions would be exposed to outside observers, investigators would 
adhere to best (or at least better) practices and be deterred from 
misconduct,29 and law enforcement agencies would be incentivized to 
provide up-to-date training and oversight. 
Devine provides other examples of legal decisions that are beset by 
cognitive bias, and he too suggests a number of procedural remedies.  For 
instance, joinder of criminal charges biases jurors’ judgments against a 
defendant because jurors attribute multiple instances of wrongdoing to a 
defendant’s criminal disposition and confuse evidence relevant to multiple 
charges.  Devine warns that joinder should be used cautiously and, when 
feasible, avoided altogether.  Devine describes studies which show that 
when multiple charges are leveled against a defendant in a single trial, 
jurors are unable to compartmentalize the evidence and consider each 
charge on its own merits.  Rather, they become confused about which 
evidence is associated with which charge and make negative dispositional 
 
27 Although the likelihood seems small that investigators would be willing to engage in 
lateral thinking and generate alternative hypotheses, detectives in the United Kingdom are 
encouraged to do so.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICING EXCELLENCE, PRACTICE ADVICE ON 
CORE INVESTIGATIVE DOCTRINE 2005, at 22–23 (2005).  Police officers in Canada have been 
ordered to take into account “all the information available” and to disregard evidence only if 
they determine that it is unreliable.  See Dix v. Canada, 2002 ABQB 580, ¶ 357 (Can.). 
28 This procedure has been shown to reduce commitment to a previously made choice.  
Charles R. Schwenk, Effects of Devil’s Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry on Decision 
Making: A Meta-Analysis, 47 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 161, 
163, 168 (1990).  It can also reduce “groupthink,” whereby social pressures within a group—
especially a group with a clear and strong leader—can stifle debate and lead to suboptimal 
decisions.  See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY 
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982). 
29 Saul M. Kassin, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: The Fifth Rule, 22 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 649, 652 (1998). 
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inferences about the defendant that increase the likelihood of conviction.30  
Devine considers but discards the possibility that a simple procedural 
reform, namely a limiting instruction, could effectively debias these 
judgments.  (Such an instruction would tell jurors to consider only the 
evidence that is directly relevant to the particular charge for which it 
applies.)  Unfortunately, limiting instructions on this issue—like limiting 
instructions in general31—have been shown to have little effect on 
eliminating bias.32  Hence, a better procedural recommendation is for judges 
to sever charges and reduce the likelihood that jurors will make adverse 
dispositional attributions of defendants charged with multiple offenses.33 
Simon and Devine both write about the likelihood that jurors’ 
decisions regarding a defendant’s guilt can be influenced by the confidence 
with which a prosecution eyewitness identifies the defendant as the 
perpetrator.  In one study, the confidence expressed by the eyewitness was a 
stronger predictor of jurors’ verdicts than the accuracy of the 
identification.34  Witnesses who learn that another person has identified the 
defendant as the perpetrator35 and receive otherwise confirming feedback 
from a lineup administrator36 show increased confidence in the accuracy of 
their identifications—even when that information is fictitious.  Such 
 
30 Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of 
the Legal and Psychological Literature, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 349–50 (1985); Edith 
Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
193, 204–06 (1985); Sarah Tanford et al., Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The 
Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 319, 332–35 (1985).  
31 DEVINE, supra note 3, at 61. 
32 See, e.g., Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Social Inference Processes in Juror 
Judgments of Multiple-Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 749, 761 (1984); 
Greene & Loftus, supra note 30, at 203–04. 
33 Edie Greene & Leslie Ellis, Decision Making in Criminal Justice, in APPLYING 
PSYCHOLOGY TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183, 198 (David Carson et al. eds., 2007). 
34 R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A 
Replication and Extension, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 337 (1989).  Several other studies 
have documented the impact of witness confidence on jurors’ judgments.  E.g., Amy L. 
Bradfield & Gary L. Wells, The Perceived Validity of Eyewitness Identification Testimony: A 
Test of the Five Biggers Criteria, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 581, 590–92 (2000); Neil Brewer 
& Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-
Juror Judgments, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361 (2002). 
35 Lora L. Levett, Co-Witness Information Influences Whether a Witness is Likely to 
Choose from a Lineup, 18 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 168, 178 (2013); C. A. 
Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness 
and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714, 720–22 (1993). 
36 Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation 
Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 117 (2002). 
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feedback also distorts eyewitnesses’ retrospective judgments about their 
opportunities to view the perpetrators, how much attention was paid, and 
how easy it was to make identifications.37  Importantly, these are precisely 
the sorts of judgments that the U.S. Supreme Court deems essential to 
determining whether an identification based on suggestive procedures 
should nonetheless be admissible, thereby compounding the bias.38 
As both Simon and Devine point out, because witness confidence can 
have a profound impact on jurors’ willingness to convict, these findings 
suggest obvious and easily instituted reforms in the ways that eyewitnesses 
are questioned and lineups are conducted.  In Simon’s words: 
All identification procedures should be “double-blind”: the administrator must be kept 
unaware of the identity of the suspect; the witness should be informed that the 
administrator does not know the suspect’s identity 
The administrator should refrain from any communication or behavior that could be 
interpreted as suggestive or revealing of the identity of the suspect 
The witness should announce his recognition or non-recognition, followed 
immediately by a confidence statement.  The witness should not be given feedback 
before completing the statement.39 
Returning to the question of how extensive these and other procedural 
changes should be, some proposed revisions are surely heavy-handed.  
These include suggestions that because jurors have difficulty translating 
qualitative assessments into monetary awards, particularly for punitive 
damages,40 judges should be used in their place.41  Other proposals are far 
 
37 Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A 
Meta-Analysis of the Post-identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
859, 864–65 (2006). 
38 See generally Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness 
Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2009) (discussing and critiquing 
suggestive identification procedures). 
39 SIMON, supra note 4, at 83. 
40 See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform, 
33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 34 (2004); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: 
The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 64–66 (1998); Cass R. 
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 
107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2110 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 
54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167–70 (2002).  But see rejoinders by Theodore Eisenberg and 
colleagues, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An 
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 763–65 (2002); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The 
Relation Between Punitive and Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the 
Mass of Awards, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL & LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
105, 115 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008). 
41 Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance 
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less draconian.  Examples include urging judges to become aware of 
prospective jurors’ difficulties in gauging their own susceptibilities to bias 
and to remain skeptical of jurors’ assurances of impartiality, a common 
occurrence during voir dire.  Still other proposals—for example, that jury 
instructions be drafted without legalese and that judges provide jurors with 
helpful responses when asked to clarify the law—are somewhere between 
these two extremes.  Some of these proposals for reducing bias, such as 
double-blind lineups and more comprehensible jury instructions, would 
effectively improve the quality of legally relevant decisionmaking.  Other 
reforms, such as requiring eyewitnesses to make immediate confidence 
judgments or making judges more aware of juror bias, would not 
necessarily stop predictable irrationality in its tracks.  Nonetheless, they 
would enable the authorities (e.g., police investigators, judges) to place the 
proper weight on decisions made by witnesses and jurors, thereby indirectly 
improving the functioning of the system as a whole. 
Behavioral decision theorists, in particular, tend to distrust the abilities 
of various legal decisionmakers and instead favor increased bureaucratic 
control of their judgments.42  But the consequence of such paternalistic 
interventions is reduced reliance on the collective wisdom of the very 
people entrusted to judge the actions of others.  Is there a more restrained 
and nuanced way to bring legal decisions in line with deductive logic and 
rational choice theory? 
III. NUDGING DECISIONMAKING IN THE LAW 
Both legal scholars and economists43 have advocated for subtly 
restructuring legal decisions to allow for different thought processes to 
predominate and thereby to prevent distortions created by cognitive errors.  
One version of this perspective, outlined in the influential book Nudge: 
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness,44 urges 
policymakers to consider cognitive biases that are likely to hold sway and 
to design “choice architectures” through which decisions are structured and 
 
as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 916–17 (1998); Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not 
Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179, 207–15 (1998).  Yet judges 
seem prone to the same cognitive errors that affect jurors.  See Guthrie et al., supra note 19, 
at 819–21; Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 
ILL. L. REV. 363, 386–87, 396 (1999). 
42 Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly 
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 511 (1983); Michael D. Green, Negligence = 
Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1610 (1997). 
43 See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1546 (1998). 
44 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 17–39. 
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choices are described in ways that acknowledge these biases.  According to 
Nudge, this work is to be done by “choice architects” whose expertise 
allows them to design situations in which decisionmakers can make better 
choices.45  The notion of choice architecture has caused a significant stir in 
academic circles46 and has been implemented in several real-world contexts 
in which people make less-than-optimal choices, including healthcare, 
charitable giving, financial planning, and environmental protection.  In each 
of these contexts, choice architects have “nudged” people by imperceptibly 
changing the decisionmaking task to prompt them to make better choices. 
Though not explicitly advocating that the legal system be nudged, 
Thaler and Sunstein would agree, we believe, that psychological science as 
offered up by Devine and Simon is inherently relevant to legal decisions 
and could be used to render those decisions fairer.  In fact, we suspect that 
the economist, lawyer, and psychologist mingling at that cocktail party 
could easily engage around the notion of nudges in the law, debating the 
right and wrong ways to nudge, and pondering the ethical and legal 
consequences of revising the system based on science.  We use the 
remainder of this Review to explore the ways that nudging could be gently 
used to benefit jury decisionmaking (à la Devine) and the criminal justice 
process more broadly (à la Simon). 
The authors of Nudge, economist Richard H. Thaler and legal scholar 
Cass R. Sunstein, suggest that nudging can be most beneficial when would-
be nudgers have much more “expertise” than decision makers themselves, 
when the context includes “decisions that are difficult, complex, and 
infrequent, and when [decisionmakers] have poor feedback and few 
opportunities for learning.”47  These conditions are virtually synonymous 
with most jury trials, given that in contrast to professional (or even lay) 
judges,48 jurors typically are selected for their lack of expertise.  In the 
overwhelming majority of instances, they serve in only one trial, are given 
no feedback on whether the judge or other “experts” would have reached 
 
45 Id. at 3. 
46 See, e.g., P. Dolan et al., Influencing Behavior: The Mindspace Way, J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 264, 265 (2012); Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn Welch, Debate: To Nudge or Not 
to Nudge, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 123, 123 (2010); Evan Selinger & Kyle Powys Whyte, 
Competence and Trust in Choice Architecture, 23 KNOWLEDGE TECH. & POL’Y 461, 462 
(2010); On Amir & Orly Lobel, Book Review, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral 
Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2118–24 (2009). 
47 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 247. 
48 Although lay participation in legal decisionmaking is, on the whole, declining, some 
countries outside the United States are experiencing success with lay judges.  See, e.g., 
Valerie P. Hans, Introduction: Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making, 25 LAW & 
POL’Y 83, 87, 88–89 (2003). 
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the same conclusion, and often have to grapple with difficult material. 
A prerequisite for nudging is recognition of the judgmental biases that 
are likely to arise in various situations and of the details about how they can 
derail rational decisionmaking.  Fortunately, on these issues Devine and 
Simon have done the heavy lifting for us.  For example, Devine explains 
that when jurors are exposed to inadmissible evidence during trial and 
instructed to ignore it, they are unable to do so, particularly when the 
evidence fits with the narrative they favor at the time.49  Judges typically 
forge ahead after giving such a directive, with little apparent concern that 
they just highlighted and underscored the very information they want jurors 
to disregard.  Does choice architecture suggest a better way?  Declaring a 
mistrial and issuing a directed verdict are rarely used (and in the case of 
mistrials, inefficient) remedies, so attention should focus on preventing 
exposure to inadmissible evidence in the first place.  But it is a staple of 
televised legal dramas—and probably real trials as well—for attorneys to 
introduce evidence that they know will be objected to and declared 
inadmissible, hoping that once the genie is out of the bottle, it cannot be put 
back in.  Devine suggests that preventing exposure can be achieved by 
various preemptive moves, including increasing the sanctions for attorneys 
who solicit inadmissible testimony and vetting any questionable material in 
pretrial hearings or sidebars.  Otherwise stated, by nudging the attorneys. 
Similarly, Simon describes how confirmation bias in the context of 
criminal investigations can lead to tunnel vision, whereby a suspect’s mere 
status as “suspect” early in the investigation can cause investigators to 
search solely for additional evidence supportive of the suspect’s guilt and to 
ignore evidence either of his innocence or of another party’s guilt.50  The 
bias can lead not only to false convictions (a bad outcome for the innocent 
suspect) but also to a failure to apprehend the real perpetrators (a bad 
outcome for other potential victims and society as a whole).  Simon 
recommends combating the bias by implementing strategies (i.e., nudges) 
such as “promoting a healthy skepticism” and encouraging and welcoming 
the generation of alternative hypotheses.51 
Choice architects can also influence decisionmaking by varying the 
 
49 For an excellent meta-analysis on this point, see Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on 
Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (2006). 
50 SIMON, supra note 4, at 24. 
51 Id. at 45.  Simon notes that procedures along these lines already exist in the United 
Kingdom and Canada.  He also observes that motivational biases limit the effectiveness of 
debiasing in certain situations such as criminal investigations.  Id.  Nonetheless, it might be 
just the sort of nudge that can tip an investigation from an inaccurate to an accurate outcome. 
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structure of the choice task.52  One means of accomplishing this is by 
determining the optimal number and ordering of choice options that will lead to 
both rational and preferred outcomes without overwhelming decisionmakers’ 
cognitive capabilities.  There are no formulae or recipes for doing so, and the 
nature of any restructuring will depend on the particular task.  But some general 
recommendations apply, including considering decisionmakers’ willingness to 
engage in the task fully, their familiarity with important components of various 
choices, and the complexity of the task. 
The importance of task complexity is seen in the results of studies that 
examine how the consolidation of increasing numbers of plaintiffs in complex 
tort cases affects jurors’ abilities to reach fair and predictable outcomes to each 
plaintiff.  In one study, mock jurors were able to award compensatory damages 
consistent with the extent of plaintiffs’ injuries from exposure to contaminated 
groundwater when the trial involved only four plaintiffs, but they were unable to 
make appropriate distinctions among those same four plaintiffs when their cases 
were consolidated with four additional plaintiffs at trial.53  Increasing the number 
of plaintiffs beyond four increased the amount of evidence that jurors had to 
process and impaired their abilities to attend to each plaintiff’s unique evidence 
in a particularized manner.  These findings provide a clear suggestion to choice 
architects—such as trial judges—to be wary of the consequences of consolidating 
multiple parties in the same trial for the sake of efficiency: jurors’ cognitive 
abilities are quickly overwhelmed and less-than-optimal decisions can result. 
This example, and others like it, raise the question of whom, exactly, the 
choice architects in the legal arena should be.  Trial court judges are perhaps the 
most obvious choice, as they have so much control over issues that can enhance 
or impair trial fairness, such as joinder/severance, consolidation, and 
admissibility of evidence.  Judges are also impartial, at least theoretically, which 
lends them an aura of credibility as nudgers, compared to, say, attorneys.  
However, to the extent that judges themselves are susceptible to cognitive 
biases,54 they might not be in the best position to nudge jurors toward better 
decisions. 
Simon argues that effective reform is difficult because of “two important 
mindsets that help sustain the process despite its limited accuracy: the 
marginalization of factual accuracy and the denial of the process’s 
shortcomings.”55  By this, he means that the adversarial process often places 
 
52 Eric J. Johnson et al., Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23 MARKETING 
LETTERS 487, 488–90 (2012). 
53 Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Effects of Trial Complexity on Decision Making, 81 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 757, 761–64 (1996). 
54 See Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 819–21. 
55 SIMON, supra note 4, at 209. 
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procedural rights above accurate verdicts, and that faith in the effectiveness of 
those procedural safeguards discourages openness to reform.  Given the 
pervasiveness of these mindsets, more than nudging might be necessary. 
Policymakers such as state supreme courts and legislatures would seem to 
be in better positions to serve as choice architects than those in the trenches, like 
judges and police officers.  These rule-making bodies have the power to 
promulgate evidence-based criminal justice procedures.  For example, the U.S. 
Department of Justice under Attorney General Janet Reno issued guidelines for 
federal law enforcement to follow in conducting lineup identifications.56  More 
recently, the Supreme Courts of New Jersey57 and Oregon58 have adopted 
evidence-based procedures for determining the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence; and in late 2012, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a 
new jury instruction on eyewitness identification, the purpose of which is to help 
jurors in weighing eyewitness testimony.59  Explicit policies like these might be 
somewhat stronger than the type of gentle nudge envisioned by Thaler and 
Sunstein; nonetheless, they will be subtle enough when applied to actual 
witnesses and jurors in the field, and they are likely to have a salubrious effect. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The new books by Simon and Devine can be read in either a pessimistic or 
an optimistic light.  The pessimistic take is that the reasoning engaged in by 
jurors and other players in the American justice system is fraught with bias and 
irrationality, which can lead to serious and potentially devastating consequences 
like false convictions.  The optimistic take is that many, and maybe even most of 
these biases are—if not totally correctable—at least reducible.  To get us there, 
judges and other policymakers might need little more than a gentle nudge in the 
right direction.  Support for that idea comes from Thaler’s and Sunstein’s well-
reasoned contention that nudging can improve decisionmaking in many realms.  
We have tried to show that nudges could also lead to enhanced decisions in the 
law, and we commend Devine and Simon for providing examples of meaningful 
nudges.  If more behavioral scientists follow their examples, our cartoon 
protagonists will have much to talk about for many years to come. 
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58 State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
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